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REVIEW ESSAY
H.L.A. HART: A LIFE IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY©
A LIFE OF H. L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE
DREAM BY NICOLA LACEY (OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY
PRESS, 2004) 422 pages.1
BY KEITH CULVER
2
Interviewer: "How would you sum up your contribution to legal philosophy?"
Hart: "I don't know what to say. I hope it has both enabled people to take a wider view
of the nature of law and the problems that arise in the running of the legal system and
[also that] it has given them a sensitivity to accuracy, clarity of expression, and its details.
[But] it may be an illusion."3
Whatever the ultimate value of H.L.A. Hart's contribution to
legal philosophy, his contribution is no illusion, and it is much more than
a contribution of a particular view of law and the merits of the methods
of its construction. Assessment of that value is, however, maddeningly
difficult, even once we work past Hart's own mixture of hope, doubt,
and self-deprecation, and on to the words of his colleagues.
Ronald Dworkin began his seminal 1967 attack on "the ruling
theory of law," proffered by Hart, explaining that "I choose to focus on
his position, not only because of its clarity and elegance, but because
here, as almost everywhere else in legal philosophy, constructive thought
must start with a consideration of his views."4 A decade later, in the year
of Hart's seventieth birthday, Peter Hacker and Joseph Raz introduced
© 2005, K. Culver.
1 [A Life ofHL.A. Hart].
2 Keith Culver, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director, Centre for Social
Innovation Research, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada.
David Sugarman, "Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman"
(2001) 32 J. L. & Soc'y 267 at 293.
4 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1977) at vii.
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their Festschrift for Hart in a similar vein, identifying Hart as the
foundational figure of the rebirth of English-speaking jurisprudence.
They wrote:
At mid-century political philosophy was said to be dead and legal philosophy appeared to
be dying. The only fruits that could be obtained from that field of intellectual activity
were the gleanings from ancestral sowings. A quarter of a century later a transformed
landscape is revealed-legal philosophy flourishes as never before. The responsibility for
this renaissance is H.L.A. Hart's. His work provides the foundations of contemporary
legal philosophy in the English-speaking world and beyond. His teaching, in Oxford and
elsewhere, has inspired many a young philosopher to turn to jurisprudence in the
reasonable expectation of a good harvest.5
Many have done just that. As Zenon Bankowski put it, "Then,
there was only him. Now, a hundred flowers bloom-. This is his lasting
contribution."6 Those "flowers" were, of course, not simply inspired by
Hart's championing the intellectual and practical rewards of legal
philosophy. They were and are compelled by his arguments, even as
those who have done most to explore those arguments move beyond
them. Consider, for example, Joseph Raz's reflections on Hart's
application of philosophy of language to problems in legal philosophy:
There are probably no general lessons to learn from the story I have told, but it strikes
me as a sad one. Very little seems to have been gained in all of Hart's forays into
philosophy of language. The problems with the explanation of responsibility, legal agents
such as corporations, the nature of rights and duties, the relations between law and
morality-none of them was solved nor their solution significantly advanced by the ideas
borrowed from the philosophy of language.7
There is something of a puzzle in this. While Hart is lauded for
his contribution to legal philosophy's "transformed landscape," Hart
and Raz both express doubt regarding the merit of substantial portions
of Hart's commitments and efforts. How, then, should We understand
' P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz, eds., Law, Morality and Society Essays in Honour of H.L.A.
Hart(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) at v.
6 Supra note 1 at 361.
'Joseph Raz, "Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison" in
Jules Coleman, ed., Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to 'The Concept of Law' (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001) 1 at 5-6. Compare Hart's words in 1983 in the introduction to his
Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy "These and other insights of modern linguistic philosophy
are I think of permanent value, and the analytical study of the law has been advanced by them, but I
certainly see a number of defects in my deployment of these ideas in my early essays." See H.L.A.
Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) at 4 [Hart, Essays in
Jurisprudence].
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Hart's legacy? As Hart saw so well, "jurisprudence trembles so
uncertainly on the margin of many subjects that there will always be
need for someone, in [Jeremy] Bentham's phrase, 'to pluck the mask of
Mystery' from its face."8 Was Hart that someone? A large part of the
answer to that question can be found in Nicola Lacey's admirable new
biography of Hart: A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream .'
Writing a review essay on Lacey's superb book is both eased and
complicated by other appreciations of it. Some have been written by
those who knew Hart, his circle, and his intellectual circumstances.
Some have been written for the popular press. Each approach is
informed by the interests of its author and the interests of the intended
audience; from those whose interests and careers intersected with
Hart's, to those with relatively little interest in legal philosophy and
rather more interest in Hart as a figure from the age in which Oxford
grew from a haven for "bright young people" to its present enviable
stature. These approaches seem, however, to leave something of a gap,
missing the interests of the emerging generation of legal philosophers
for whom Hart is a revered figure, yet a figure known only at a distance.
Even for those of us in some sense close to Hart, as I was while a
student of Wil Waluchow and Joseph Raz, Hart's life and character
were not an ordinary topic of discussion. There was no unspoken
injunction against inquiry into Hart's life: it was simply clear that
arguments are separable from their authors, and as legal philosophers,
our chief concern is with arguments. Then and now this seemed to me a
reasonable response to the danger of undue psychologizing regarding
the motivation of particular arguments.
Perhaps something like a wariness regarding this danger
underpins Professor Thomas Nagel's controversial London Review of
Books review of A Life of H.L.A. Hart."° Nagel castigates Lacey for both
philosophical failures in her appreciation of Hart's intellectual context
and incautious emphasis on personal matters irrelevant to intellectual
biography. An exchange of sharply phrased letters to the London Review
8 H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1957) 71 Harv. L. Rev.
593 at 594.
9 Supra note 1.
" "The Central Questions" London Review of Books 27:3 (February 2005) 12 [Nagel,
"Central Questions"].
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of Books has followed, ending rather strangely with Nagel's appeal to
something like old-fashioned decency as the basis for one criticism,
responding to objectors that
I agree with the writers of both these letters that the use of intimate material presents
difficult issues, and that reasonable people can differ. My review expressed a personal
view, that their use should be more restricted than" is now customary, without the
subject's express or implied consent, until a substantial time after his death."
Nagel presses on, condescendingly telling those who protested
against his objection to Lacey's reading of J.L. Austin that "I was a
student of J.L. Austin, and cannot help having a different view of his
philosophical temperament and a different understanding of his
influence on his contemporaries from what one could gather from his
meagre published writings. (He died at the age of 48.) "12 This appeal to
personal experience and reminder of the well-known fact of Austin's
early death is odd in itself, and especially odd when addressed to Simon
Blackburn and Jeremy Waldron, eminent scholars well aware of the
context of Austin's work. Yet Nagel's concerns are, to some extent,
comprehensible and reasonable if one takes the internal, participant
perspective of those who recall firsthand the intellectual milieu of the
Oxford of Hart's times.
For Nagel and those who share his views, Lacey's reporting of
unpleasant aspects of Hart's life may well appear unseemly and
unnecessary, of little relevance to understanding Hart's arguments. Yet
quite apart from the dangers of psychologizing arguments to the point
where their logical strength is a lost factor in their assessment, there are
equally significant dangers inherent in failing to understand arguments
in the social context in which they arose and were treated as reaching
salient conclusions or raising problems in novel and compelling ways.
There is little question that the new generation of legal
philosophers can evaluate arguments on their own merits; yet this
generation is very much in need of insight into the social context in
which arguments were made. Lacey's thorough, balanced, and
philosophically nuanced biography provides a superb resource for our
understanding of Hart's social context. And I, at least, am grateful that
Lacey resisted the urge felt by Nagel to omit discussion of painful parts
1 Thomas Nagel, "Letters" London Review of Books 27:4 (February 2005) 4.
'
2 Nagel, "Central Questions," supra note 10 at 12.
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of Hart's life. Lacey has written this biography of Hart at a time when
his students and some of his contemporaries are still available to giv.e
first-hand impressions of Hart and the notoriously self-conscious Oxford
world. Far from embarrassing Hart, Lacey's fulsome use of Hart's and
others' perceptions of themselves, one another, and their times show
him to be a humane and duty-driven man, all too sensitive to the
importance of doing well by friends and colleagues, while striving to
leave legal philosophy in a better state than that in which he found it.
I. A LIFE IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
Lacey's title borrows from Hart's essay "American
Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream,"'" an exploration of the "nightmare" situation in which the need
for legal determinacy is persistently overwhelmed by variable exercise of
judicial discretion," and the contrasting "noble dream" of legal
determinacy in a legal order where "judges should apply to their cases
existing law and not make new law."' 5 This arresting contrast is quickly
put into context, as Hart explains the means by which he gained it,
saying that "there are important aspects of even very large mountains
which cannot be seen by those who live on them but can be caught easily
by a single glance from afar."' 6 Characteristically, Hart's initial bold
claims are followed by a precise indication of the borders of his
argument:
But great areas of thought are not to be assessed by aphorisms torn from their context,
and remembering Henry James's warning, I shall, in devoting most of this lecture to the
concentration of American thought on the judicial process, claim only that this is one
salient feature of American jurisprudence contrasting strongly with our own. 7
It would be overreaching to suggest that Hart's life mirrored the
oscillation visible in the structure of "American Jurisprudence through
English Eyes," yet there is more than just heuristic value in an account
of Hart's life that takes very seriously his sense that he lived in the midst
t- (1977) 11 Ga. L. Rev. 969, reprinted in Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence, supra note 7 at
123.
14 Ibid. at 126.
5lIbid at 132.
'
6 Ibid. at 123.
171bid. at 124.
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of temptations to extremes, his typical choice of a carefully identified
mean between those extremes, and his occasionally falling prey to some
extreme. Lacey's approach to these tensions is extraordinarily graceful,
sometimes using section titles to suggest but not legislate an
understanding of the consequences of a particular train of events in
Hart's social circumstance, perceptions, and choices. Even as Lacey
opens A Life of H.L.A. Hart recounting quite lightly the events leading
to Hart's last period of flourishing, in his late seventies, she works
beneath the warning offered in the introduction's title, "An Outsider on
the Inside." This gestural approach to final judgement about Hart's life
brings all available evidence to the reader and suggests rather than
forces conclusions. Lacey expresses this dimension of her
methodological commitments clearly at the outset:
I have tried to write about Herbert H-art in a way which opens up the different levels of
meaning which might be given-indeed which, at different moments, he gave-to his life,
without in the process being irritatingly tentative. I have also tried to end on a note which
does justice to his achievements without obscuring his complexities. In these terms, the
writing was a journey of "interpretation" rather than "discovery": though in saying this, I
do not mean to imply that biography raises no questions of truth and falsehood, fact and
fiction. 8
Achievement and complexity are the unquestionable hallmarks
of Hart's life, and Lacey's achievement lies in her unravelling of the
tangle between the two. The relation between these hallmarks is usefully
approached from the contrast between Lacey's work, A Life of H.L.A.
Hart, and Professor Tony Honor6's brief yet comprehensive summary of
Hart's career. This summary is well worth reproducing in full, as the
backdrop against which Lacey's interpretation must be projected.
Honor6 wrote:
H.L.A. (Herbert) Hart (1907-1992) was the son of a Jewish tailor of Polish and German
descent. He was educated at Bradford Grammar School and New College Oxford, where
he obtained a brilliant first class in Classical Greats. He practised at the Chancery Bar
from 1932 to 1940 along with Richard (later Lord) Wilberforce. During the war, being
unfit for active service, he worked in MI5. During this time his interests returned to
philosophy and in 1945 he was appointed philosophy tutor at New College. He was
strongly influenced by the linguistic philosophy then current in Oxford, but employed its
techniques more constructively than did most members of the movement. In 1952, given
his chancery background, he was persuaded by J.L. Austin to be a candidate for the
Oxford chair of Jurisprudence when Professor Arthur Goodhart resigned. He was
elected and held the chair until 1969.
's Supra note 1 at xix.
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From 1952 on he delivered the undergraduate lectures that turned into The Concept of
Law(1961, posthumous second edition 1994). He also lectured on right and duties, but
these lectures were never published. He held seminars with Tony Honor6 on causation,
leading to their joint work Causation in the Law(1959, second edition 1985). His visit to
Harvard in 1956-7 led to his Holmes lecture on "Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals" (1958) and a famous controversy with Lon Fuller. Returning to the UK he
engaged in an equally famous debate with Patrick (later Lord) Devlin on the limits
within which the criminal law should try to enforce morality. Hart published two books
on the subject, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963) and The Morality of the Criminal Law
(1965). A wider interest in criminal law, stimulated by Rupert (later Professor Sir
Rupert) Cross was signalled by his "Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment"
(1959). Nine of his essays on the criminal law were collected in Punishment and
Responsibility (1968). In 1968 he was asked by Oxford University to chair a commission
on relations with junior members, then at a low ebb, and produced a notably perceptive
and constructive report.
Feeling that his powers were waning Hart resigned his chair in 1969, to be succeeded by
Ronald Dworkin, a severe critic of his legal philosophy. He now devoted himself mainly
to the study of Bentham, whom, along with Kelsen, he regarded as the most important
legal philosopher of modem times. Ten of his essays were collected in Essays on
Bentham (1982). From 1973 to 1978 he was Principal of Brasenose College. In his last
years he was much concerned to find a convincing reply to Dworkin's criticisms of his
version of legal positivism. A sketch of Hart's reply is to be found in the postscript to the
second edition of The Concept of Law.
Hart's main aim as a lecturer and writer was to tell the truth and be clear. He was the
most widely read British legal philosopher of the twentieth century and his work will
continue to be a focus of discussion.19
Consider, in light of this diplomatic account of Hart's life,
Lacey's clo*sing assessment in the final pages of A Life of H.L.A. Hart,
marking in stark terms the gulf between his private and public. personae:
It was appropriate that the public tributes to Herbert's life focussed on his colossal
achievements, his large contribution to the infusion of legal policy with liberal values, his
awesomely cultured persona, and his distinctively humane personal qualities. This public
story of Herbert Hart's life was, of course, true; its validity in no way compromised by the
equally true story of his struggle to overcome depression, his incompletely resolved
attitude to both his sexuality and his Jewish and class origins, his volatile shifts between
intellectual confidence and insecurity, his unconquerable emotional reserve, and his
long-standing sense of not really being what he actually was: an influential and respected
insider in the social and professional worlds in which he moved. Rather, in the light of
these complexities, his intellectual, institutional, and personal achievements appear all
the greater.
20
Tony Honor6, "H.L.A. (Herbert) Hart (1907-1992)," online: Legal Philosophy in Oxford
<http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/jurisprudence/hart. shtml>.
2
°Supra note 1 at 363.
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Honor6 emphasizes achievement and adds gracenotes of
complexity. Lacey places achievement in an enlarged context dominated
by sometimes disturbing evidence of interwoven elements of complexity.
Simply putting one picture over the other does not do much to
demonstrate the full merit of Lacey's work, since the traits and events
she identifies often well up and subside in Hart's life, only to resurface
later in similar form, and sometimes in combination.
The tension between confidence and insecurity accompanied
many crucial events in Hart's life, with confidence rooted in
achievement, and insecurity rooted not just in a feeling of being an
outsider, but in a deeper worry about the value of the life resulting from
the choices he made-often after agonizing thought and discussion. This
is not simply a matter of ordinary fluctuations between emotional highs
and lows, but a persistent, acute, and sometimes paralyzing sense of the
possibility of ruinous failure. No single instance of this enduring tension
is especially telling-there is simply a series of events varying in their
particular ingredients and effect on Hart's life. Let me trace a few
illustrative examples in Hart's academic life, against the backdrop of
Honor6's sketch.
Where Honor6 passes seamlessly from Hart securing a "brilliant
first class in Classical Greats" to Hart's next step toward his successful
legal practice "at the Chancery. Bar from 1932 to 1940, ' ' 21 Lacey's
narrative provides one of many episodes of swings between intention,
hope, achievement, and troubled reflection. She writes:
His refusal to contemplate achieving anything other than first class marks gives a sense of
the exceptionally high standards which Herbert set for himself. But it was also born of
the fact that, despite his resolve to go to the Bar, he was far from having abandoned his
academic aspirations at Oxford. His reputation as an outstanding intellect had already
brought him the offer of a lectureship in philosophy at Jesus College only months after
his graduation. But his sights were set higher still. In 1929 he entered the Prize
Fellowship competition at All Souls, the University's only college devoted exclusively to
research.
2
Failure after his first attempt in this competition brought
depression: "[R]eferences in later letters to a 'breakdown' at the time of
the first failure show that he took it very hard."' Hart recovered and
21 Supra note 19.
22 Supra note 1 at 41.
23 Ibid. at 42.
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tried again, and again did not succeed and was troubled by this failure.
Lacey writes: "When, at the end of a year during which he studied hard
while supporting himself by teaching English, French, and even
Scripture to public schoolboys at Rugby, he was rejected a second time,
the disappointment was acute., 24 The imprint of a familiar pattern is
visible here. In the wake of great achievement-a first, an enviable
reputation, and an offer of employment-Hart's capacity to enjoy the
fruits of that achievement was limited by his tendency to press still
harder to achieve more, and achievement of anything less than the
sought after goal brought upheaval.
It would be misleading to suggest, however, that all of these
upheavals were damaging or counterproductive. Honor6 notes that Hart
"held seminars with Tony Honor6 on causation, leading to their joint
work Causation in the Law (1959, second edition 1985)" and goes on to
describe Hart's visit to Harvard in 1956-57.' These were not entirely
discrete events. Even as Hart enjoyed a signal triumph in delivery of his
Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture on "Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals," other aspects of his experience of American
approaches to jurisprudence caused misgivings and compelled Hart to
action. Lacey quotes Hart's own unusually positive assessment of his
delivery of the paper: "Uncharacteristically, he realized that the lecture
had gone well: 'The Holmes curiously enough was a very great success.
250 or more and I had really prepared in the end something I thought
quite good, and fairly polished.' ' 2 6 While pleased with the reception
given to this paper, Hart was troubled by his long and productive
discussions with Herbert Wechsler regarding jurisprudential issues in
criminal law, eventually deciding that Causation in the Law would need
substantial redrafting to incorporate greater emphasis on policy issues
connected with judicial and legislative handling of these issues. Hart's
anxiety regarding his co-author's response to Hart's new insights was
ultimately unfounded as Honor6 agreed to undertake revisions, yet even
with this matter out of the way, Hart's diary records his misgivings
regarding his own capacity to refashion his contribution: "Down panic,
down .... Better-a bit. Preface and Chapt I of book-passable. Felt at
24 Ibid.
2Supra note 19.
26 Supra note 1 at 197.
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least the way more clearly defined. ... Of course part is that I don't quite
know what I think and another part that this scale job demands better
organizing powers than mine.""7 The end result of these efforts was
widely lauded, revised in 1985 (largely by Honor6), and continues to be
read as a seminal contribution to the topic.
In a similar vein, Hart's resignation from the Chair of
Jurisprudence is not just a story of his sense that "his powers were
waning," as Honor6 puts it.28 Lacey traces this complex path with great
sensitivity, seeing in Hart's Punishment and Responsibility a loss of the
kind of relentless urge to excellence expressed in Hart's earlier work:
"But in Punishment and Responsibility, while references and the
criticisms which they contain are minutely-almost obsessively-noted,
their provocation is not really taken up. This foreshadowed his later
frustrating and energy-draining preoccupation with responding to his
critics."" When Hart resigned the Chair, all were surprised, and few
were invited into Hart's thoughts to understand his choice. Lacey
explains: "His admission to [his daughter] Joanna of his feelings about
Punishment and Responsibility was one instance. Another was his remark
to Joseph Raz, during one of their weekend excursions to the country,
that he felt he had said everything he had to say and was perplexed
about what to work on next."3
There is a remarkable similarity here between the lives of Hart
and Isaiah Berlin, as these old friends each struggled to surmount the
obstacles that seemed, at least to them, to be crucial to their intellectual
reputations. As Hart turned to editing Bentham and worrying about a
reply to critics following his departure from the Chair, Berlin failed to
complete the book on romanticism he had long expected to produce.
Berlin's editor, Henry Hardy, explains that Berlin had hoped to write
the book
27 1bid. at 211.
SSupra note 19.
29 Supra note 1 at 283.
3 ]boid. at 289.
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ever since giving the (unscripted) A.W. Mellon Lectures on this subject, in March and
April 1965, at the National Gallery of Art in Washington. In the years that followed,
especially after his retirement from the Presidency of Wolfson College, Oxford, in 1975,
he continued to read widely with a book on romanticism in mind, and a large mass of
notes was accumulated .... But the new synthesis continued to elude him, perhaps partly
because he had left it too late, and so far as I am aware, not so much as a sentence of the
intended work was ever written.
3
'
Further similarity follows, as Berlin's Roots of Romanticism and
Hart's "Postscript" to The Concept of Law were both assembled by
editors from incomplete draft material. Unlike Berlin, however, Hart
managed to at least begin to face his challenge, albeit in halting steps
spurred on by his editing of Bentham and the rich threads of argument
begun by Bentham.32 Lacey rightly points to the importance of Hart's
response to Dworkin in "Legal Duty and Obligation," written for Essays
on Bentham.33
' H. Hardy, "Editor's Preface" in Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999) at ix-x.
32 Lacey's use of Hart's diaries is especially poignant here, recording the worries of a man in
his seventies attempting to restore the wholeness of a point of view developed two decades before:
Quite panic-generating! But remember there is time and a larger
framework may present itself into which these revisions fit and
mistakes calmly confronted: Stand back!
And the next day:
So pick up task (struggles with my soul(a) to do this large task at all
(b) to be able to be honest about errors without wrecking the book
.... Courage and calm both needed! (fantastic at 72.)
Last night kept awake for a time by panic thought about this! Why
not cool: what does it matter to confess errors even as large as this
at my age? (Life of errors: why have I had success?)
As was usual with Herbert, the anxieties, broken nights, chaotic note-books, and
intimidating list of "PLAIN ERRORS AND DIFFICULTIES TO BE MET" gradually
generated steadily accumulating insights, as he worked his way exhaustively (and
exhaustingly) through and took detailed notes on a huge number of critical articles, most
of them by American authors. "Illuminating talks" with Joseph Raz contributed to this
progress, and he began to feel his "spirits rising" and even to envisage "an Indian
summer of work for publication."
See supra note 1 at 336.
33 H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1982) 127 [Hart, Essays on Bentham].
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Throughout the course of Hart's sharp shifts between
intellectual confidence and despair, similar swings were evident in his
attitude to the tangle of people, commitments, and events of his private
life. Hart's intermittent engagement with his Jewish patrimony, his
tentative homosexual feelings, his sense of his own emotional arrest at
the point of truly deep engagement with others, and particularly his
wife, Jenifer Hart-all of these undeniable facts of Hart's life and
emotional constitution are in some way counterbalanced, albeit not
always successfully, by his efforts to overcome them.
Hart's capacity for friendship, for example, was enormous and
enormously resilient. Sir Christopher Cox, once Hart's tutor at New
College, was a sounding board, an advisor, and a very demanding friend.
Cox lived for a time in a cooperative arrangement with the Harts and
others during the war, and notwithstanding Cox's evident intellectual
power, his coarseness, depressions, and general eccentricity could only
be tolerated by a great friend willing to take all as it came. 4 Fortunately,
Cox recognised Hart's friendship for what it was, and Lacey reports
Cox's frank acknowledgement of his debt in a letter congratulating Hart
on his 1968 election to an Honorary Fellowship of New College: "'This
is tremendous news and for none more than one who owes you a very,
very great deal-through the ages ... ' ."'
Other friends tried Hart's patience in even more violent ways,
with effects careering on into Hart's family life. Perhaps the best
indication of Hart's resilience is in his reaction to being told by Jenifer
Hart in 1959 that she was pregnant: "His first question was, 'Was it his?'
I assure him it is, but make him say whose he thinks it is if not. 36 Hart
had good reason for concern, since he knew of Jenifer Hart's affair with
Isaiah Berlin: "Herbert's 'ignorance' of the affair survived Berlin's
confession to him, on at least two occasions, that he was in love with
Jenifer."37 When Jacob was born, Hart set aside his concerns regarding
' Any doubt regarding the burden Cox imposed on friendship can be easily dispelled.
Consider, for example, the conduct Hart reports in a letter to Jenifer Hart: "Cox is in insanely wild
spirits-obsessed again about his breasts. He cuddles them a great deal and this morning offered to
squirt milk from them into my tea. He is so fat there that when it is shoved forward out of his
pyjamas jacket it looks like the real thing. It gives him great pleasure." See Lacey, supra note 1 at
108.
3 Ibid. at 109.
36 Ibid. at 237.
37Ibid. at 177.
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paternity as it became evident that Jacob suffered severe developmental
difficulties; and while in the longer term both Jenifer and Hart worked
effectively to assist Jacob, in early efforts, Lacey writes, "Herbert [Hart]
was the driving force, with Jenifer remaining reluctant to face up to the
real scale of Jacob's disabilities., 38
This willingness to face up to trying circumstances was by no
means a one-off. Hart frequently brought his capacity for acute analysis
to his own inner life, with results whose excruciating honesty must have
been at least as disconcerting for Hart as they are for any reader of his
diaries. While he visited Harvard in 1957, for example, his diary records
his thoughts on his frail marriage and his homosexual leanings:
Meanwhile ... a noble letter from Jen which must have cost her hell to write. She says
things could be alright if we could resume: what a blow my last 10 years of declining
interest in that has been. Once we've spoken as much as this we can start afresh but there
are the "perversions of my make up."39
His letter in response to Jenifer is open and optimistic,
generously taking on his share of the causes of their troubles:
It was noble of you to write like that and it must have been hell to write so, but I'm sure it
will do a lot of good: I'm sure we can extricate ourselves from the psychological jam: and
of course you mustn't ascribe it to any failure on your part. How could you, how could
anyone cope better with my mixture of infantilism, pride, crudity?4"
It is extremely difficult to know what to make of these
unburdenings beyond observing that their effects fell short of disaster:
the Harts were married for fifty years and Lacey reports that Jenifer
Hart was "horrified" by suggestions that she might resolve issues with
Herbert Hart by separating from him.4
However discomfiting it may be to take up these examples of
Hart's complex private life, the effort is worthwhile, I think, for those of
us concerned to know how to mine more out of Hart's insights, and,
crucially, when to stop. The idea that Hart's life divides between the
nightmare and the noble dream is, in light of these examples, little more
than an arresting phrase soon left behind as we examine Hart's life more
38 Ibid. at 238.
9 Ibid. at 204.
40 Ibid. at 205.
41 Ibid. at 362.
20051
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
comprehensively. What Lacey shows us in this deeper investigation is
Hart's resilience in the face of his difficulties, a man exceptionally aware
of what he at least thought his innermost desires, strengths, and
weaknesses were, and prepared to confront those desires, strengths, and
weaknesses when not overcome by depression. Hart's resilience had
consequences for the choices he made, and in those choices there may
be important resources for our understanding of aspects of Hart's legal
philosophy.
IL EXPERIENCE AND THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW
AND PHILOSOPHY
Lacey's work shows that at various times Hart found himself
feeling that he lacked philosophical resources to continue. This is in
itself an illuminating piece of biography, as it suggests that the limits to
what may be teased out of Hart's arguments may be reached sooner
rather than later. Hart did not just run out of time in which to offer
responses to critics. Rather, as he said in the "Postscript" to the second
edition of The Concept of Law (whose first part is consumed with a
response to Dworkin and whose second part was not written but was to
be composed of a response to other critics), his critics had been right in
"more instances than I care to contemplate. 42
The limits of Hart's arguments may be further illuminated by
consideration of what he did when philosophical success eluded him or
could not be approached on satisfactory terms, from his turning to legal
practice upon completion of his undergraduate degree, to his wartime
experience of M15, and on to his personally rewarding experience in the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, and later, his service as Principal
of Brasenose College. Unlike many professional philosophers, the sum
of Hart's professional experience was not philosophical. Hart's varied
work in M15 included a May 1945 investigative trip to Germany carried
out after he had accepted a position at New College, Oxford. Hart's
keen interest in what he saw led him to wonder whether he had made
the right choice in returning to academic life and "made him wish that
he had accepted the legal post in Germany which the civil service had
42 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. by J. Raz & P. Bulloch (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994) at 239 [Hart, The Concept of Law].
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offered the previous year."43 Instead, he wrote an article on his
experiences for The Economist,' and went on to Oxford. The insights
Hart accumulated on this trip are not well recorded beyond his
Economist article, yet there is something quite tantalizing in his remark
that he gained what he recalled as the "impression of a crazy gang [in
other words, Hitler's government] living hand to hand-pulling off
gigantic bluffs."45 How did this experience inform his sense of the
distinction between legal and moral obligation? Is there anything in this
experience motivating Hart's response in "Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals" to those "German thinkers who lived through the
Nazi regime and reflected upon its- evil manifestations in the legal
system"?46
Similar reflections might arise out of consideration of Hart's
other experiences outside academic life. Eight years in legal practice
gave him the foundation that gave his friend Douglas Jay reason to
invite Hart in 1966 to serve as a part-time member of the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission, which he did with great success and great
interest until 1972 and his appointment at Brasenose. Lacey reports that
Hart "was regarded as an outstandingly effective member of the
Commission, applying not only his legal skills.but also his general critical
acumen in putting searching questions to the business people who
appeared before the panel."47 Hart's own feelings about his participation
were wholly positive: "I loved [it]; it was fascinating: [One] had a sense
of really being in the works. '... I can't imagine anything else I would
have enjoyed as much as that."4 Hart's later work on the governance
structure of Oxford University provided him with a similar opportunity
to blend principle with practice.
There are no firm grounds for association of these experiences
with particular ideas in Hart's philosophy of law. Yet there may be-in
Hart's diverse experience of a particular legal system, his experience of
the collapse of another, and his experience of university-based systems
43 Lacey, supra note 1 at 122.
44 H.L.A. Hart, "Berlin-September 1945" The Economist (29 September 1945) 446.
4 5 Lacey, supra note 1 at 120.
' Supra note 8 at 616.
47 Supra note 1 at 284.
48 Ibid.
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of rules-a series of hints about the way we might regard his ambiguous
engagement with empirical phenomena. In a particularly revealing
passage, Lacey explores the extent of Hart's engagement with sociology,
long thought to be at best a case of too little, too late, and never really
sufficient to explain Hart's often-cited suggestion in the "Preface" to
The Concept of Law that the book could be regarded as an exercise in
"descriptive sociology." 49 Lacey reports that Jean Floud, an Oxford
sociologist sympathetic to Hart's work, "pressed Herbert on why he had
not taken more seriously the great early sociologists Max Weber and
Emil Durkheim, and it was under her influence that he read Durkheim
and Talcott Parsons and began to think about the implications of their
thought for criminal law."5 Lacey further suggests that in light of his
1967 paper "Social Solidarity," Hart is reasonably viewed as having an
undesirable blind spot with regard to the recognition due sociological
contributions to legal theory. Lacey writes:
His view boiled down to the idea that because the social sciences can never produce
evidence as compelling as the natural sciences, they are not worth pursuing. This is a
convenient rationalization for staying firmly within philosophical method, which is not
the sort of enterprise which concerns itself with empirical data in the first place.
Herbert was, after, all, a philosopher, and he worked within a philosophical community
which conceived its own boundaries narrowly. But his scepticism about the potential for
a fruitful exchange between legal theory and the social sciences had to do with more than
just his disciplinary background. Philosophy was the imperial discipline at Oxford, and
being a successful philosopher-even from the margins of the Law Faculty-meant being
an insider.5
Lacey's judgement here is certainly plausible, and bolstered by
her discussion of Hart's insistence that his set of questions was
distinguishable from those of sociologists and historians;52 yet I take it as
a virtue of her approach that it is possible to see the way to another view
of the evidence she has gathered. I am surprised that Lacey asserts so
firmly that the philosophical method is "not the sort of enterprise which
concerns itself with empirical data in the first place" and that Hart was a
philosopher who accepted this view.
4 Supra note 42 at vii. On this matter see Leslie Green, "General Jurisprudence: A 25th
Anniversary Essay" (2005) 25 Ox. J. Legal Stud. 565 at 576.
o Supra note 1 at 260.
5' Ibid. at 261-62.
52 Ibid. at 229-30.
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Since at least W.V. Quine, philosophers have taken seriously the
possibility of "naturalised philosophy," that is, philosophy that is in some
sense continuous with the natural sciences. 3 Philosophy plainly is, at
least on this view, the sort of enterprise that can and ought to concern
itself with empirical data. Questions remain, of course, regarding the
status of the insights provided by social scientists, and here it seems right
to distinguish between Hart's concerns regarding the fruitfulness of the
methods of social science and his approach to empirical evidence. Hart's
inclination against social science was not blind, and the facts of Hart's
life indicate a more complex, less than fully worked out relation of his
legal philosophy to empirical phenomena. In his normative work in
Punishment and Responsibility, for example, a great deal of empirical
data is utilized; Lacey reports that, in 1970, Hart "worked with David
Soskice, a young economics colleague at University College, to trace the
statistical evidence which might illuminate declining recourse to
dangerous 'back-street' abortions and hence bolster the utilitarian case
for maintaining and indeed extending legal access to abortion."54 Hart's
teaching commitments within the University also demonstrated keen
concern with the relevance of empirical data to legal theory. Lacey notes
that Hart participated in a seminar on norms conducted by Brian Barry
and Jean Floud, and "in 1966 joined forces with them in a seminar on
'Sociological Evidence for Legal and Political Theories'."
55
In all of this there is an obvious contrast between Hart's use of
empirical evidence in his contributions to normative philosophy and his
comparative independence from such evidence in "descriptive and
general,56 analytical legal philosophy. What can be made of this? And
more importantly for present purposes, what can intellectual biography
do to deepen our understanding of the reasons for this contrast? It is
likely too simple a solution to suppose that Hart was so thoroughly in
the grips of Austinian linguistic philosophy that his philosophical
contribution to law could be little more than a paean to linguistic
philosophy. As Brian Leiter observes:
s See e.g. W.V. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized" in Ontological Relativity: And other
Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969) 69.
' Supra note 1 at 302.
5 5 Ibid. at 272.
5 6 Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 42 at 240.
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Leslie Green has argued that the role of ordinary language philosophy in Hart's project
has been overstated. ... In one sense this is true: there is only one explicitly ordinary-
language argument in the book, the appeal to the difference in ordinary language
between having an "obligation" and being "obliged" to do something as a way of showing
that the Austinian analysis of the concept of law mischaracterizes the normativity of law.
... But insofar as Hart also subscribes to the Razian conception of legal theory described
by Dickson-and I take it he does-then he shares a philosophically more important
affinity with ordinary language philosophy: namely, the assumption (the confidence) that
there are deep truths about reality, including social reality, to be found via careful
consideration of ordinary concepts, whether or not we access those truths via explicit
invocation of ordinary language.5 7
Leiter's assessment, unfortunately buried in a footnote, is exactly
right in its depiction of Hart's confidence in the value of consideration
of ordinary concepts. Behind this confidence there remains a mystery to
the extent that Hart supposed his hermeneutic concept of law answered
different purposes than those urged by historians and sociologists, yet as
an exercise in "descriptive analytical jurisprudence" it was not a piece of
armchair philosophy but "a contribution to the study of human society
and culture."58 As a contribution to the study of human society,
empirical evidence must enter. But how? How much? And from where?
Apart from Hart's admittedly incomplete statement and
deployment of a descriptive-explanatory method in The Concept of Law
(and given revised expression in the Postscript), there are other
indications of the kind of empirical phenomena to which the method is
to be applied. Lacey herself points to one of Hart's motivations for
taking up the study of Bentham; Hart's admiration for what in the
"Introduction" to Essays On Bentham he describes as "Bentham's
extraordinary combination of a fly's eye for detail, with an eagle's eye
for illuminating generalizations applicable across wide areas of social
life."59 The metaphor contained here, taking distance as an expression of
a particular viewpoint, is repeated elsewhere, in the essay that inspired
Lacey's title. In "American Jurisprudence through English Eyes," Hart
justifies the lecture of an English lawyer to an American audience on
their own experience with the reminder that aspects of large mountains
-z Brian Leiter, "Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: the Methodology Problem in
Jurisprudence" (2003) 48 Am. J. Juris 17, n. 93. See also Leslie Green, "The Concept of Law
Revisited" (1996) 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1687; Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2001).
58 H.L.A. Hart, "Comment" in Ruth Gavison, ed., Issues in Contemporary Legal
Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 35 at 36-37.
59 H.L.A. Hart, "Introduction" in Hart, Essays on Bentham, supra note 33, 1 at 4.
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unnoticed by those on them can be seen "at a single glance" by those
looking from a distance. Just what the "single glance" method consists
of remains unclear, even as Hart is prepared, in some fashion, to apply
it, as the detail he takes up is often concerned with clearly legal, and not
exclusively philosophical, detail.
In "Legal Duty and Obligation," the essay written for Essays on
Bentham in which Hart begins to respond to Dworkin and to Raz, Hart
welcomes Raz's development of "detached normative statements" as "a
valuable supplementation to my own distinction drawn in The Concept
of Law between external statements about the law and internal
statements made by those who accept the law."'6 Yet Hart dissents from
part of Raz's analysis, and he does so on grounds ineluctably connected
to the question of the role of empirical evidence in Hart's legal theory.
Hart writes:
I would quarrel, however, for reasons I explain later both with Raz's characterization of
the legal point of view from which he considers such detached statements are made and
with his account of what is involved in the judges' acceptance of the laws of their system.
Into both of these Raz injects a moral element which is, I think, unrealistic but is
necessary for his account of the normativity of legal statements of duty.61
At the root of Hart's objection is a complaint that Raz gains
consistency at the cost of an "unrealistic" account of an important
dimension of his account of legal normativity. Description from afar of
mountains in the distance is nonetheless description of mountains, Hart
seems to say, and propositions about those mountains must correspond
to verifiable facts about those mountains. Yet it is unclear in this
passage and elsewhere just what Hart supposes is unrealistic about Raz's
view, and more importantly, which facts gained in what way allow Hart
to reach this conclusion. I and many others have been puzzled by Hart's
claim, and have tried to flesh it out to evaluate its worth against Raz's
alternative.6" In "Legal Obligation and Aesthetic Ideals: A Renewed
60 H.L.A. Hart, "Legal Duty and Obligation" in Hart, Essays on Bentham, supra note 33,
127 at 154-55 [Hart, "Legal Duty"].
6) Ibid. at 155.
62 A useful account of some of the tensions surrounding Hart's and Raz's views on legal
normativity can be found in Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001). See especially lecture nine on "Authority and Reason" and lecture ten on "Practical
Difference." Both lectures were originally delivered as part of Coleman's Clarendon Lectures in
Law in 1998.
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Legal Positivist Theory of Law's Normativity, ' 63I tried,, for example, to
expand on Hart's assertion that not just moral reasons, but "any
reasons" will do as grounds for officials' acceptance of their duties. I
departed from Hart's argument in response to Raz, which follows:
Far better adapted to the legal case is a different, non-cognitive theory of duty according
to which committed statements asserting that others have a duty do not refer to actions
which they have a categorical reason to do but, as the etymology of "duty" and indeed
"ought" suggests, such statements refer to actions which are due from or owed by the
subjects having the duty, in the sense that they may be properly demanded or extracted
from them.6
Hart argues that while judges must have "comprehensible
motives" for accepting "enactments by the legislature as determining the
standards of correct judicial behaviour and so as constituting reasons for
applying and enforcing particular enactments,"65 moral motives are not
required. It is enough that judges "simply wish to continue in an
established practice or that they had sworn on taking office to continue
it or that they had tacitly agreed to do so by accepting the office of
judge."66 In trying to discern what might count as some of the "any
reasons" that would demonstrate the unrealistic nature of Raz's
argument, I developed an account of non-moral aesthetic ideals as a
possible motivation for judicial acceptance of law in Hart's sense of
acceptance, and attempted to ground that account on empirically
substantiatable examples.
I remain convinced of the probative value of that argument, but
I am now less sure of its force, and my uncertainty is driven by Lacey's
account of Hart's motivations, engagement with empirical phenomena,
and response to exasperated insistence that he ought to give greater
consideration to sociology and history. I suspect now that my extension
of Hart's vision is just that-an extension of Hart's vision at the same
eagle's eye level resting on the "single glance" approach to apparently
obviously salient empirical phenomena. The trouble with this extension,
of course, is that this method of acquiring empirical data contains no
6 Keith Culver, "Legal Obligation and Aesthetic Ideals: A Renewed Legal Positivist
Theory of Law's Normativity" (2001) 14 Ratio Juris 176.
'
4 Hart, "Legal Duty," supra note 60 at 159-60.
65 H.L.A. Hart, "Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons" in Hart, Essays on
Bentham, supra note 33, 243 at 265.
66 Ibid.
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epistemic tests for reliability of the single glance, no criterial or other
filters for relevance, and so on. This leaves Hart with few options with
which to sustain his theory. He is committed to claiming that Raz's
account is inferior because it is unrealistic, yet there cannot be
assessment of the realistic quality of a theory of law as a social practice
without empirical evidence, and Hart has set aside the social sciences as
sources of empirical evidence and has only made a gesture toward the
method for acquiring the required empirical evidence. The gesture may
be sufficient if Hart or Hartians are willing to settle for a "thin" version
of the concept of law, or what I have described as an "essentially vague"
concept of law,67 but Hart's wish to speak of "realistic" legal theory
likely precludes this move. All that is left is the hope that there is
something left to be found in Hart's arguments to drive a more robust
approach to inclusion of empirical data.
Lacey's biography inclines me toward thinking that Hart knew
perfectly well the value of empirical evidence to the realism of legal
theory, and explored methods of incorporating that evidence into both
his normative legal philosophy and his descriptive, normatively
uncommitted legal philosophy, as seen in his participation in a seminar
with Barry Stroud, and what John Finnis reports as his carefully marked
up copies of work by Weber. Yet Hart simply couldn't see his way from
his preferred eagle's eye view to a convincing account of the relation of
empirical phenomena to that view. I suspect Brian Leiter's demand that
legal philosophy be naturalized is now the only way to go for positivists
who wish to go beyond exaggerated lexicography and haphazard, "single
glance" incorporation of empirical data into the descriptive component
of their nonetheless general legal theory. Perhaps this is a step too far
for Hart, whose legal philosophy was intended to be properly
philosophical, but whether Leiter is right is a matter for argument
elsewhere.
What matters here is that Lacey's biography of Hart can be seen
to matter not just to intellectual history but to legal philosophy. Lacey
gives us the resources to see that, in Hart's own view, his argument was
at an end: "I have to admit that in more instances than I care to
contemplate my critics have been right."68 We must stop looking to
6 Keith Culver, "Leaving the Hart-Dworkin Debate" (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 367.
6 Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 42 at 239.
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Hart's arguments for further hints to be expanded into the "real"
comprehensive Hartian view of things: we must press on without Hart.
III. CONCLUSION
Were it not for Professor Nagel's review, I might have written
differently, perhaps confining myself to evaluating Lacey's work qua
intellectual biography. Nagel's reaction has opened a different path,
demanding consideration of the distinction between biography and
history and the possibility that biography ought to condition intellectual
history in ways typically given too little consideration in, at least, the
limited context of legal philosophy. In making a case for a relation
between Hart's life and his legal philosophy, I have necessarily
encountered, albeit only tentatively, the question of how we ought to
understand the relation of personal history to application of research
method, arguing that in Hart's case there are discernible connections
between his life and his philosophy that give us valuable insight into the
limits of his arguments.
My discussion was straightforward and at least intuitively
plausible; yet it is not the sort of discussion routine in legal philosophy.
No one in philosophy of biology doubts for a moment that Darwin's
biography is relevant to the development of his key insights, in turn
driving a revolution in understanding of the problems of philosophy of
biology. Why should philosophy of law be any different? Why is Hart's
time in M15 not legal positivism's voyage on H.M.S. Beagle? The answer,
of course, lies in a version of the question Hart faced, and was unable to
answer, in seeking an empirically robust philosophy of law. Why is it that
lived experience, some of which is ostensibly the raw data of social
science, is not relevant to understanding Hart's arguments while it is
precisely that kind of data that must be included in any full-blooded
response to the questions of legal philosophy? However we go about
facing the challenge Hart left behind, and however we bring the single
glance from afar into systematic legal philosophy, the fact that our next
questions are so clearly laid before us owes a great deal to Lacey's
wonderful biography and its stretch beyond biography into substantive
legal philosophy.
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